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Abstract 
 
JAMES TERRY: The Forty Thieves: Churchill, the Cairo Conference, and 
The Policy Debate Over Strategies of Colonial Control in British Mandatory Iraq, 
1918-1924 
(Under the direction of Dr. Richard Kohn) 
 
  After World War I, Great Britain found itself unexpectedly occupying vast 
swaths of the Middle East, including the modern-day nation of Iraq. The final disposition 
of its Middle Eastern possessions was initially unclear, and the British government 
explored several policy options before finally selecting air policing, a novel colonial 
control scheme wherein aircraft would be used in lieu of ground forces to provide a 
British military presence in Iraq.  
  This thesis examines the process by which Britain chose air policing as its 
best strategy for Iraq. Air policing was intensely controversial from the very beginning. 
The internal debate it sparked within the government was intense and bitter. That air 
policing ultimately won out over rival policy options was due to a combination of factors, 
including Churchill’s advocacy, financial cuts, manpower reductions, and policymakers’ 
determining that air policing represented the best possibility for Great Britain to maintain 
influence in Iraq. 
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Introduction 
World War I unexpectedly resulted in the destruction by Great Britain of the 
centuries old Ottoman dominion in the Middle East. British forces were present across 
the Middle East, from Egypt to the modern-day nation of Iraq on the borders of Iran. 
British officials had not anticipated this at the onset of hostilities of war with the Ottoman 
Empire in 1914. The most immediate question in the Middle East in 1918 facing British 
policymakers, therefore, was the final disposition of its wartime territorial acquisitions.1 
Some provision for a post-Ottoman Middle Eastern order had been made during 
the war, most prominently in the then-secret Sykes-Picot Agreement approved by the 
French and British Cabinets at the beginning of February 1916. Francois Picot, the 
French representative at the negotiations, was descended from a French colonialist family 
with long-standing interests in North Africa and southeast Asia, while Sir Mark Sykes – a 
member of Parliament with a reputation as an authority on all questions pertaining to 
Middle Eastern affairs, as well an amateur historian of the Ottoman Empire – represented 
Great Britain. Jointly, they negotiated to divide European interests in the Middle East 
between their two countries, France receiving responsibility for Syria (including 
Lebanon) and Great Britain Mesopotamia, as Iraq was then known.2 
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Sykes-Picot delimited the respective French and British spheres of influence in 
the Middle East after World War I. It did not, however, set out to any degree of 
specificity how Great Britain or France would control their newly-won possessions. In 
point of fact, Great Britain’s entire position in the Middle East was deeply controversial 
domestically. British officials argued for continued retention of British influence in Iraq 
along several lines. For one, Iraq was serving as an increasingly vital link in a chain of air 
stations connecting Great Britain with India. These airfields not only greatly sped the 
delivery of mail and equipment, but also enabled Britain to rapidly reinforce its imperial 
garrisons. Oil was also on the mind of the British cabinet. Withdrawal, several Cabinet 
members feared, might increase Iranian influence in Iraq, and threaten Britain’s access to 
Iraq’s oil, the presence of which remained largely conjectural but nevertheless highly 
anticipated and important to Britain’s postwar plans. For another, a continued British 
presence in Iraq provided a bulwark against any Turkish attempt to rebuild its power in 
the region. Britain remained officially at war with Turkey until 1924, and although a 
ceasefire was in place from November 1918, British officials in Iraq continuously 
worried about the external threat Turkey posed to Iraq. The impact of a putative British 
retreat from Iraq on India was also calculated. Britain feared the possible impact a 
crescent of anti-British states stretching from Egypt through Iran might have on India’s 
Muslim population. Retaining a British military garrison in Iraq would serve to drive a 
wedge through any potential Muslim axis and thereby weaken its negative effects.3 
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 Iraq at the time was known as “Mesopotamia” – in Greek, literally the “land between 
the rivers,” in this case the Tigris and the Euphrates – and comprised three separate 
geographical areas. The north was mountainous and inhabited largely by Kurds, a semi-
nomadic people ethnically distinct from the people who inhabited the southern two-thirds 
of the country. The floodplain between the two rivers was the most fertile part of the 
country and inhabited by the bulk of the Iraqi population, which totaled no more than two 
and a half million in 1920. The people living along the Tigris and Euphrates were settled 
agriculturalists practicing alluvial farming and were divided between Arab Sunnis and 
Arab Shia, the two major sects of Islam. Shia outnumbered Sunnis, but the Sunni 
community was more powerful politically. Desert comprised the rest of the country, 
stretching across the south of Iraq from Basra, a river port near the Persian Gulf, and up 
west, where Iraq abutted Syria, then under French control. This vast area was inhabited 
largely by Bedouin nomads.4 
 To control this vast, underdeveloped, sparsely inhabited land, Great Britain relied 
upon indirect methods of rule, rather than direct forms of government through British 
officials and administrators. This accorded well with wartime British promises, as well as 
statements made by British leaders. In January 1918, for instance, Prime Minister David 
Lloyd George declared that the Arab portions of the Ottoman Empire are “in our 
judgment entitled to a recognition of their separate national conditions.” The Baghdad 
Proclamation of March 1917, made when British forces first occupied Baghdad, the 
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capital of Ottoman Mesopotamia, also called for government by native officials in 
“collaboration” with Great Britain. Although all such statements were open to 
interpretation and short on specifics, they nevertheless presented a formidable barrier to 
direct annexation into the British Empire of Iraq after World War I.5 
 Measures of financial economy were also important; indeed, a careful reading of the 
relevant documents from the period shows that much of Britain’s Iraq policy was driven 
by the perceived necessity of cost-cutting measures. Costs in Iraq were indeed steep: 
during the summer of 1919, when Iraq was still under British military government, the 
garrison cost the British government some £2.7 million per month. Such costs were 
thought to preclude the possibility of anything greater than an indirect role for Great 
Britain in Iraq’s postwar affairs.6 
 The significant uprising in July 1920 was also a major factor in the evolution of 
British policy decision-making process. The uprising was sparked by Baghdad 
nationalists angered that Britain had not met its stated obligations to devolve power to the 
Iraqi national level some two years after the end of World War I. The rebellion spread to 
Najaf and Karbala, two holy cities in the south of Baghdad, where the Shia religious 
hierarchy came out in support of the uprising on the grounds that non-Christians lacked 
any legal or religious authority to govern in Muslim lands. Shia nomadic tribesmen also 
rose, led by tribal sheikhs angered by the British imposition of taxes and labor requisiton 
orders for public works, and armed with legal opinions of Shia clerics justifying their 
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actions. By August of 1920, Great Britain was faced with the nightmarish situation of a 
general Iraqi revolt.7 The rebellion was contained by January 1920, but at great cost. The 
Iraqi garrison was enlarged to some 100,000 troops. Some 900 British troops were killed 
and another 1,300 wounded.8 
 The uprising drove Great Britain to speed up the process of Iraqi independence. In 
January 1921 the British government approached Faisal ibn Husayn to assume the throne 
of Iraq. Faisal was a Sunni Arab from Syria who had briefly been proclaimed king of 
Syria in Damascus before being driven to abdicate by France, asserting its position in 
Syria after World War I. Faisal fled the Middle East for London, where he was 
approached by intermediaries from the British government. Faisal accepted their 
entreaties, and in August 1921 was duly crowned the first king of Iraq.9 Faisal thereupon 
invited the British government to retain a military presence in Iraq to safeguard the royal 
regime’s external and internal security. Britain’s presence was regularized in a military 
agreement of 1924 between the governments of Britain and Iraq.10 
 After the 1920 uprising was put down, Britain’s army presence in Iraq was rapidly 
reduced and supplemented by air power. The process of substitution of ground power by 
air power enabled Great Britain to maintain control of Iraq a colonial control scheme 
known at the time as air policing. Air policing was a system that relied heavily upon the 
striking power of the aircraft to bomb villages, tribes, or individual leaders that proved 
unwilling to acknowledge the authority of the central government of Iraq, to implement 
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directives from the central government, or to pay taxes. As a practical matter, few major 
population centers in Iraq were more than several hours airtime from central British 
airbases located around Baghdad. Air policing therefore enabled Great Britain to 
maintain a military presence across Iraq without the need for large-scale, expensive army 
garrisons.11 
The existing scholarship of British policy in Iraq in the late 1920’s and 1920’s is 
voluminous and highly useful. Among these works, several stand out. One is Peter 
Sluglett, perhaps the best historian of this period, and whom is best known for his work 
on the British Mandate period. However, Sluglett pays very little attention to military and 
defence-related matters. Martin Gilbert is invaluable for anyone looking to detail various 
Churchillian strategies and schemes for reducing military costs in the Middle East post- 
World War I. David Omissi has written the best general reference work on air policing, 
and he extensively covers the phenomenon in its various interwar iterations from Iraq to 
Afghanistan.  
None of these works, however, devotes much attention to how British 
policymakers came to decided upon air policing as the most effective strategy for Iraq. 
Air policing was in no way a foregone conclusion. It was in fact a highly contentious and 
controversial plan that revealed deep divides within the British government. That is was 
adopted as British policy in Iraq is in no small way a tribute both to Winston’s 
Churchill’s (then dual-hatted as Colonial Secretary and Secretary for Air) advocacy, and 
Hugh Trenchard’s (the commander of the British Royal Air Force) skills as a 
bureaucratic infighter. But it also represented a calculated, reasoned risk in Iraq on the 
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part of the British government.12 How air policing’s champions finally won over the 
policymakers is a crucial albeit often overlook aspect, and serves as the focus of this 
thesis. 
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The Bureaucratic War Over Air Policing 
When British forces marched into Baghdad in March 1917 close on the heels of 
retreating Ottoman forces, Lieutenant General F. S. Maude, the British commander, 
under directions from the British Foreign office, issued a proclamation that British forces 
came not as conquerors but as liberators, and that Great Britain had no designs to impose 
foreign political regimes or institutions on Iraq.13 Iraqis were invited, “through your 
Nobles and Elders and Representatives, to participate in the management of your civil 
affairs in collaboration with the Political Representatives of Great Britain.”14 There are 
multiple possible interpretations the historian can place on such statements. Undoubtedly 
British officials intended to deflect accusations of territorial aggrandizement both from 
local Arab leaders and, even more importantly, from the French (who planned to carve 
out a Middle Eastern empire of their own from the Ottoman carcass) and from the United 
States. Maude himself objected strenuously to the proclamation. He felt British 
administration in Iraq was crucial to maintain order. Furthermore, the proclamation itself 
evinced profound ignorance within the British government about the realities of Iraq. For 
example, Maude argued, while a great deal of attention was given to the aspirations of the 
Arab people, no mention was made of the Jews, whom Maude believed constituted a 
majority of the inhabitants of Baghdad in 1917.  
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The proclamation almost certainly created more problems than it solved.15 No 
provision for the creation of a government was authorized, beyond vague announcements 
of support for Arab self-government. In part to solve this conundrum, a Mesopotamian 
Administration Committee was established on March 16, 1917, over the protests of the 
Government of India, which although controlled by Great Britain had in interest in 
governing Iraq itself, rather then seeing the Colonial Control receive responsibility for it. 
Faced with a personnel crisis over a severe shortage of qualified officials to staff a 
nascent Iraqi administration, the newly established Mesopotamian Administration 
Committee agreed to accept Government of India control over Iraq, with the important 
proviso that such control was not permanent, and was contingent upon wartime 
exigencies. General Maude was thus in the unusual and ultimately untenable position of 
“preaching self-rule while discouraging its practice.”16 British administrative 
responsibilities for Iraq were growing at the same time expectations were being raised of 
greater responsibilities being devolved to Iraqis themselves. Few seemed to have been 
aware of the incongruities of the arrangement, or were blasé about the possible 
consequences. As the future Iraqi minister of defense pointedly observed since 
independence for Iraq under the Mandate was a matter of British policy, it was obvious 
that “British military occupation will gradually cease.”17 On the other hand, Gertrude 
Bell, the famous assistant to Arnold Wilson, the civil commissioner and senior British 
official in Iraq from the end of World War I through 1921, felt “the people of 
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Mesopotamia, having witnessed the successful termination of the war, had taken it for 
granted that the country would remain under British control and were as a whole content 
to accept the decision of arms.” Such notions of Iraqi political passivity were to be 
exploded during the fall 1920 uprising. 
The first formal suggestion the airplane might be used in Iraq to maintain internal 
security was made in an internal War Office memorandum dated May 9, 1919. Addressed 
to the Director General of the Imperial General Staff, it book-ended the discussion of 
garrisoning Iraq with the frame of internal disorder and external invasion. Potential 
external enemies included Turkey, the Kemalist rump of the Ottoman Empire, and the 
Ikhwan, the religious army of the newly independent kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The 
memo accepted that aircraft would “certainly play in integral part in our arrangements 
and must, to the extent to which they are used, reduce our military force.”18 Ground forces 
would be maintained only as are “necessary for immediate emergency.”  
Responsibility for day-to-day stability would rest with the air force, although the 
War Office still envisioned that overall responsibility for Iraq would remain within the 
purview of the army. At this early stage, no independent role for the air force was as yet 
envisioned. The air force would be responsible for maintaining security, but under the 
direction and command of the army. This dynamic in the debate over Iraq policy served 
functionally as a debate within the debate, and was often the more important: where did 
ultimate responsibility for Iraq lie? For many involved in formulating policy, this was 
often the issue uppermost in their minds, as shall be seen, although it was rarely 
acknowledged as such, at least publicly.  
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 Although pioneering, little more seems to have been done with this memorandum, at 
least as regards Iraq. Generally quiescent throughout 1919, Iraq did not garner much 
attention from British military and civilian policymakers. Their attention was elsewhere. 
Provision for Iraq was made during the 1919 Versailles Treaty Conference: as one of the 
nations which had “reached a stage of development where their existence as independent 
nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice 
and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone,” Iraq’s 
existence was regularized as a matter of law in the League of Nation’s covenant.19 Yet 
when the issue of Iraq did crop up in domestic debates, the central issue was usually 
economy, except when Britain’s status as the Mandatory power in Iraq was utilized to 
give the British government domestic cover for defending Britain’s presence in Iraq.20  
The government wanted to reduce the financial burden of maintaining the Iraq 
garrison. India could partially defray Iraq costs, as Indian funds were separate from Great 
Britain’s for accounting purposes. Determining how much British expenditures in Iraq 
totaled was a complicated question that drove Treasury officials to near fits of distraction. 
Funds for Iraq were divided among cabinet ministries, government departments and 
offices, the armed services, the Government of India, as well as taxes raised locally in 
Iraq.21 No single official or department had ultimate financial responsibility. Churchill 
linked this problem with that of fractured bureaucratic responsibility, with decision-
making power of Iraq policy split between the army and the air force. After winning a 
titanic bureaucratic battle within the Cabinet for control of implementing Iraq policy, 
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Churchill moved immediately to control Iraq finances as well, prelude to cutting them 
further.22 He believed he could not continue to dun parliament for further monies when 
“nine-tenths” came from a government department other than his own.23 
The garrison in Iraq was acknowledged to be inadequate to its task, yet the 
pressure was to reduce manpower commitments as the financial imperative won out.24 
British forces in Iraq were plagued by shortages of personnel.25 Units in Iraq were 
significantly under strength, either because the slots had not been filled or—more 
commonly—because soldiers were widely seconded for administrative, engineering, and 
other tasks. Armored car units lacked qualified drivers, equipment was often inoperable 
due to desert conditions, and there were not enough logistics and communications 
specialists.26 These shortages would be gradually remedied, but in the short-term British 
forces in Iraq remained unready for an uprising. Yet British officials remained strangely 
oblivious to the dangers of rebellion, despite numerous warnings to the contrary from 
Iraqis close to British government representatives.27 This compared highly unfavorably to 
British actions in Syria, where officials took a much more aggressive and forward-
leaning posture, and where Britain set up a native administration almost as soon as it 
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occupied the country.28 By contrast, in Iraq, the foreign secretary informed the British 
high commissioner in Baghdad that “loose administrative control [was] the most to be 
expected.”29 Another British official, assessing the drift in British Iraq policy, opined, 
“You can’t be at Peace and at War at the same time.”30 Low-level military operations 
continued throughout 1919 and into 1920; given this context, the 1920 rebellion was 
more a spike in violence then a complete departure from what had gone before. 
Nevertheless, the British government focused during this period almost exclusively on 
cost-cutting measures, causing one frustrated official, realizing the disconnect between 
government policy and events on the ground, to comment somewhat peevishly that trying 
to impose a peacetime financial system while military operations were underway 
amounted to an expectation for British troops to “await financial sanction for the 
ammunition they propse[d] to fire.”31  
 Throughout this period—indeed, up through the uprising—the debate over air 
policing continued to evolve, albeit usually in areas outside Iraq. The campaign against 
Mohammad bin Abdullah Hassan and his Dervish warriors, for example, figured 
prominently in this debate, and the successful outcome for the British in this matter 
served to bolster the claims of air policing advocates, who saw Hassan’s debate as a 
victory for British air power.  
 Also known as the “Mad Mullah,” Hassan had been a thorn in the side of British 
Sudan since the mid-1890’s when he rose to power in Somalia, which he dominated for 
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the next quarter-century. Despite launching multiple punitive expeditions against him, the 
British were never able to decisively defeat him, and he allied himself with Germany 
during World War I, using German arms to rebuild his forces and emerge from the war 
greatly strengthened. When Britain moved against him in 1919-1920, it did so almost 
entirely by air, with the active encouragement of Churchill and Trenchard. Ground forces 
played a supporting role only. Within a month, Hassan had been defeated, and he fled 
into exile, dying of the Spanish flu in 1921.  
 The entire campaign was taken by the Air Ministry as a huge victory for air power, 
and one for which the air force could claim sole credit (although the army hotly disputed 
this). The apportionment of responsibility for British success was less important than the 
fact that the campaign seemed to confirm—at least in the minds of those charitable to air 
policing—that the airplane could deliver victory. The “Mad Mullah” campaign, an 
imperial sideshow, would nevertheless figure prominently in the debate over Iraq.32 
 Emboldened by Britain’s success against Hassan, Churchill attempted to apply the 
East Africa case to Iraq, while the victory was still uppermost in the Cabinet members’ 
minds. His statement on February 19, 1919, to the air force chief of staff represented his 
first systematic attempt at thinking through the various problems, possibilities, and 
implications of a putative air policing regime for Iraq.33 Characteristically cutting right to 
the heart of the matter, Churchill immediately recognized the most immediate limitation 
of air policing was its inadequacy in dealing with a Turkish invasion, one of the greatest 
potential foreign threats facing Iraq in 1920. As a peace treaty had not yet been signed 
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between Turkey and Great Britain, fears of a postwar Turkish revanche were widely held. 
Churchill discounted the need to plan for such an eventuality, as reinforcements from 
outside Iraq would be needed to deal with such a situation whether or not air policing was 
adopted. Air policing advocates, Churchill wrote, had “only to consider the maintenance 
of local and interior security.”34 On February 20th, Churchill circulated to his Cabinet 
colleagues a memorandum relating to the possibility of substantially reducing the British 
garrison in Iraq and replacing it with air power. In it, Churchill acknowledged critics who 
wanted to abandon Iraq as not worth the cost by noting that Britain remained in Iraq for 
the same strategic considerations that it had entered Iraq to begin with, namely to ensure 
an uninterrupted supply of oil for the navy, and as a deterrent to any potential Turkish 
encroachments on Egypt or the Persian Gulf.  
Churchill also revealed an appreciation for the situation by noting events were 
uncertain and the possibility for significant domestic Iraqi unrest remained, necessitating 
the continued retaining of a powerful ground force garrison in Iraq. This was a sop to 
Churchill’s army critics who deprecated the possibility for aircraft to police Iraq, a task 
much more complicated than that of defeating Hassan. Churchill remained unbowed, 
however, and continued to insist that the garrison would be substantially reduced over the 
coming months and be replaced by air power. This was before the uprising and the large-
scale reinforcement of ground troops to suppress the Iraqi insurgents provided a field day 
for air policing’s critics within the government and in the press. Nonetheless, Churchill’s 
February memorandum, although its recommendations were not adopted by the Cabinet 
as a whole, represented the first concrete instance of an attempt to apply the concept of 
air policing to Iraq, and to think through the practical implications of such a decision, 
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such as how air policing would manifest itself on the ground, what resources would be 
required, what the downsides would be, and within what timeframe air policing could 
plausibly be implemented. No concrete answers to these questions were advanced either 
by the memorandum, or in the subsequent Cabinet discussion of it, but both served to 
pave the road towards air policing in the future.35  
Churchill subsequently asked Trenchard privately if he was “prepared to take 
Mesopotamia on.”36 Trenchard was, having immediately divined the importance such 
responsibility would have for the air force institutionally. He directed the Air Staff on 
March 15 to flesh out a plan for aerial control of Iraq, which he duly submitted to 
Churchill on March 20. Trenchard emphasized the “experimental” nature of air force 
control, and argued for only limited withdrawals of British military forces until the 
experience had proved “successful.”37 Even if the air force met with the most resounding 
success in Iraq, there would still remain a critical need for ground forces, with the 
important caveat that these would come under the command of the air force. Churchill 
presented the broad brush stokes of the plan to Parliament on March 22.38 
Churchill denied that Britain needed a garrison of tens of thousands of British and 
Indian troops in Iraq. Churchill knew that parliamentary appetite for such a major 
commitment was lacking, and deprecated the necessity for it.39 Rejecting the need to 
“dominate every square mile of Iraq,” Churchill compared the Middle East with the 
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British experience of East Africa: “You open up block by block each area, and your 
influence permeates, friendly relations are established, trade springs up, local militia are 
established, [and] local troops are brought in.” 
All this activity within the Air Ministry did not go unanswered by the army, 
which circulated a memorandum of its own in February, answering the air force’s 
position point by point. The army rejected any drawdown on troop strength in Iraq, while 
acknowledging that reductions were necessary sometime in the undefined future. 
Reductions would be to “invite disaster,” the “complete abandonment of Persia,” and the 
“stultification” of recent diplomatic approaches made to the Persian king. Any future 
withdrawal would have to be careful managed so that any “retrograde movement” would 
not be misinterpreted as a “sign of weakness.” The army advocated a forward strategy by 
incorporating the province of Mosul, the final disposition of which remained to be 
decided to a future peace treaty between Great Britain and Turkey. Only by the inclusion 
of Mosul into Iraq, with all of Mosul’s surrounding oil fields, could Iraq be made to pay 
for the costs of its own occupation. Without Mosul, Iraq would be a drain on the British 
treasury, making continued British occupation of Iraq less tenable. The army also 
attempted to side-step responsibility for Iraq by pointing out that many of the problems of 
Iraq derived not from the presence of British troops, but the continued hostility of Turkey 
towards a British garrison there. The General Staff, the memorandum noted dryly, had 
not been responsible for “the policy of antagonizing the Turks and thereby embittering 
the whole Mussulman [sic] world [which] was involving us in unnecessary expense at the 
present time and laying up for us untold liabilities in the future.” By extension, the 
Cabinet, if it was looking to apportion blame, should look first at itself, the army was 
implying. “It must not be supposed,” the memorandum went on, “that the General Staff 
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are pressing for the retention of Mesopotamia, or any part of it, on strategic grounds of 
Imperial security. Our presence there is entirely a matter of State policy in which the 
military authorities have no power.”40 
This is not to say that the army wanted to abandon Iraq; far from it. The army was 
committed to remaining in Iraq, or, short of that, preventing the air force from retaining 
responsibility for it. But the army was also not interested in championing an increasingly 
controversial occupation, and this February memo attempted to square the difference. 
Having previously argued that only Mosul could make Iraq profitable, the army then 
revealed that the senior British general in Iraq was considering abandoning Mosul. In this 
way, the army hoped to force the Cabinet’s hand in deciding finally whether to commit to 
Iraq, or not. In doing so, the army seemed on the surface to present the Cabinet with a 
choice that, upon closer examination, was not a choice at all. If the Cabinet remained 
committed to Iraq, then it would have no option but to occupy the entire country 
(including Mosul). To do anything else would impose on drain on British finances, which 
the Treasury would not accept. If the Cabinet did want to remain in Iraq, it would have to 
accept the army’s forward-leaning strategy for a greater Iraq, one that included the 
Kurdish areas in the highlands to the north around Mosul and Kirkuk, and not just the 
Arab areas of the Euphrates river valley.  
The General Staff further realized that the greatest advocate within the Cabinet for 
a continued British presence in Iraq was Churchill, who was also air policing’s most 
vocal champion. The army hoped it could check the air policing scheme by turning 
Churchill’s fiscal concerns against him, and by winning his support for the army’s Iraq 
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policy.41 The army’s position was the result of a shrewd reading of the key players in the 
Iraq debate. But Churchill saw through the army’s plans, calling its bureaucratic 
maneuvering “inveterate hostility and obstruction” and a “form of warfare I have never 
seen the like in all my (now long) experience.”42  
Members from the army’s General Staff and aides to Trenchard met on March 24 
to discuss the feasibility of air policing.43 Despite tensions, the meeting was surprisingly 
civil. The army had come prepared with an estimate of the number of troops needed to 
support air force operations in Iraq. Garrison troops would be needed to hold each major 
air base, as well as advanced landing grounds. Some army officers expressed concerns 
that about hostile artillery fire, but this was considerable improbable due to the likely 
difficulties of obtaining such arms.  The air force emphasized the need for as small a 
garrison as was feasible.  
Elsewhere the air force warned against perhaps inevitable comparisons of air 
policing with World War I air campaigns. The two were not comparable, the air force 
argued.44 World War I air operations were focused on actions against enemy aircraft and 
“co-operation with other arms in actions in which land or sea forces were the 
predominating partner.”45 Iraq would differ greatly, in that the air force would have the 
lead role. This would allow the garrison requirements for a country to be considered from 
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an entirely “novel” viewpoint. Previous models relying on ground forces alone called for 
the widespread dispersal of military forces across a country in order to achieve as 
widespread a security presence amongst the local population as possible. Punitive 
columns would be dispatched to deal with disturbances, after which the troops would 
withdraw to their bases. This meant that the impact of the intervention, although perhaps 
severe initially, was also highly localized both in time and space. The results were, the 
report’s author argued, “speedily forgotten, and last results can often only be achieved by 
permanent military occupation over a period of years with coincident opening up of the 
country by railways and roads.”46 Left unsaid was the silent acknowledgement that such a 
large-scale commitment of resources to Iraq was unlikely. 
By contrast, the air force could maintain a permanent presence over even the 
harshest terrain. Aircraft had complete freedom of movement. Centrally based out of a 
few strategically located air bases, aircraft would be able to reach any point in Iraq.47 Air 
power’s “long arm” would render it “ubiquitous.” By air, frequent patrols and 
demonstration flights could keep the entire country under “more of less constant 
surveillance.” Although Trenchard dryly deprecated “education by pamphlet,” he was 
aware of its potential power. “It must be remembered,” the memorandum continued, “that 
from the ground every inhabitant of a village is under the impression that the occupant of 
is aeroplane is actually looking at him.” Events in 1919 on the Northwest Frontier in 
India might have led to conclusions to the contrary, but the air force staff apparently gave 
little credence to such arguments.48 
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From the meeting Trenchard compiled a financial estimate and forwarded it to 
Churchill.49 These figures dealt only with the additional seven squadrons the air force 
would need to send to Iraq if air policing were adopted, and did not include the three 
squadrons already present. An initial expenditure of £3.7 million was necessary to meet 
capital outlays on infrastructure and technical equipment not yet present in Iraq. 
Recurring annual costs of £1 million would be needed to maintain 10 squadrons of 
aircraft in Iraq, with personnel costing a further £1.5 million. This is to be compared with 
a garrison whose annualized cost by December 1920 was running at £30 million. 
Trenchard’s admittedly highly approximate costs—as he was the first to point out—
totaled no more than £6.2 million annually. These were economies on the order of eighty 
percent. Unsurprisingly, such cuts proved highly powerful arguments in favor of air 
policing, as Trenchard rightly realized, especially given government projections that 
expenditures were set to exceed tax receipts by more than £100 million by fiscal year 
1922. Government departments were threatened with Treasury control of their budgets if 
they did not achieve cuts.50 Perhaps surprisingly, Trenchard viewed the Treasury threat 
with confident anticipation. He felt this put the air force in the best possible position, as it 
was the branch best positioned to achieve financial economies.51 
Yet Churchill realized the power of the General Staff’s argument, and was 
thought by some to be coming round to the army’s position before events on the ground 
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in Iraq overtook the army’s plans when a general rebellion broke out in the fall of 1920.52 
An inkling of increasing tensions in Iraq cropped up in the policy papers being circulated 
at the time in London. For example, one noted that “national feeling” and the “driving 
power of religious fanaticism” was increasing over the summer of 1920.53 Interestingly, 
the same anonymous author also worried about the implications of disaffected, 
demobilized Iraqi Arab Ottoman army officers who had fought British forces during the 
Great War.  
Over 100,000 soldiers were required to suppress the rebellion, amounting to some 
52 battalions of infantry, and seven regiments of cavalry.54 This was an increase of 20 
battalions from British strength in Iraq in July, and did not include native levies raised by 
British forces, nor Indian army forces.55 In putting down the rebellion Britain suffered 
some two thousand casualties, among them 450 dead. Expenditures in Iraq for the 1920 
fiscal year nearly quadrupled.56 Troop drawdown after the October 1920 peak was swift, 
however.57 By March 1921, 33 infantry battalions remained in Iraq, only one more than in 
July, 1920. When the air force took responsibility for Iraq on October 1, 1922, only two 
British battalions were based in Iraq, leavened by some 7 Indian Army battalions. Indian 
Army expenditures were funded by the Government of India. India regularly received 
funds from Parliament to cover part of its defense budget; the balance was made up by 
taxes raised within India itself. 
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Commitments on the scale of 1920 were unsustainable and rendered the army’s 
carefully laid plans moot. The sheer scale of the current army deployments in Iraq was 
simply not politically acceptable. Churchill’s initial brilliant insight in 1918—that in Iraq, 
economy was “everything”—was truer after the rebellion than before. Even before the 
rebellion the size of British garrison in Iraq was out of scale to all previous estimations.58 
The air force thought British forces in Iraq bloated, out of scale to the perceived threat, 
and needlessly antagonizing Turkey.59 In any event, there was no appetite in London for a 
long and costly occupation. Great Britain spent some £80 million in 1919-1920, and a 
further £20 million in outlays for the rebellion, for a total of £110 million in little over a 
year.60 The Times spoke for many when it asked rhetorically “how much longer are 
valuable lives to be sacrificed in the vain endeavor to impose upon the Arab population 
an elaborate and expensive administration which they never asked for and do no want?”61 
A subsequent article labeled the British government’s policy in Iraq simply “foolish.”62  
The army was well aware of these criticisms, as were military commanders in 
Iraq. Lieutenant General A. Haldane, commander of British forces in Iraq, acknowledged 
as much when wrote to the Baghdad high commissioner, emphasizing that both he and 
the War Office were cognizant of how “unpopular the policy of maintaining a large 
garrison in this country is with a large section of the public at home.”63 While the army 
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was still not reconciled to air policing as a matter of policy, nor of the air force taking 
over responsibility for Iraq from the army, the army was increasingly accepting of the 
need for strict economies in the Iraq. This change in the army’s attitude provided an 
opening for the air force to push air policing more strongly, despite the negative coverage 
the air force received during the Iraq uprising, and led to the next great chapter in the 
evolution of British Iraq policy. 
Churchill, realizing a narrow window was opening, quickly seized his 
opportunity. He approached the cabinet and asked for the authority to chair a conference 
in Cairo on Britain’s Middle East policy. Assent was given on February 14, 1921, and a 
date for the conference was set for March 12. 
The Cairo Conference duly opened on March 12, 1921, in the palatial Semiramis 
Hotel on the banks of the River Nile. Among those attending were Churchill, Trenchard, 
and Colonel T.E. Lawrence of World War I fame. A.T. Wilson spoke for the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company and oil interests in the Middle East more generally. The Baghdad 
High Commissioner, Sir Percy Cox, was also present, as was Gertrude Bell, the only 
woman present at the meeting. Two Iraqis, Jafar Pasha and Sasun Effendi, also attended; 
both were members of the native Baghdad Council created by the British as an official 
interlocutor between British government and military representatives and the native Iraqi 
population. All told, some 40 people were present at the week-long conference. Churchill 
dubbed them his “forty thieves.” 
Churchill opened the conference with a ringing peroration on Britain’s “justifiable 
pride” in bringing the “torch of civilization now to be kindled anew in Baghdad.”64 
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Whatever the rhetoric, he knew that ensuring the long-time viability of Britain’s presence 
in Iraq meant reducing commitments, not embarking upon grand new projects of 
remarking the country in a British image. Britain would exercise power behind the 
scenes, and support a native Iraqi regime.  
The Cairo Conference took place within a general perception among British 
policymakers of British military overstretch. The War Office had identified numerous 
military “liabilities” and demands on Britain’s military resources in the immediate 
postwar period, and circulated these concerns in memoranda addressed to the Cabinet and 
to British officials in the Middle East. The army also took the opportunity to plug the 
importance of the ground soldier and deprecate the efficacy of the aircraft in colonial 
policing. “It is on the presence and example of the individual British soldier that internal 
security ultimate rests,” one War Office memorandum states, “and he must be visible in 
sufficient numbers...The [army] are fully alive to the great assistance aeroplanes, tanks, 
and armoured cars can render in wars, whether great or small, and have every intention of 
extending their use wherever possible, they would be conveying an entirely false 
impression if they held out any prospect of there effecting large reductions in infantry 
and cavalry, so long as the internal security factor continues to predominate.”65 The same 
memorandum also mentioned that airplanes would be extremely useful in the event of an 
invasion by an outside power, a sly bit of double-talk on the army’s part, as it knew that 
the chief threat to Iraq—as it admitted elsewhere—was from another uprising, not an 
invasion. More broadly, the army cited threats of unrest in England, the civil war in 
Ireland, the intervention in Russia against the Bolshevik regime in Moscow, the threat of 
a revanchist Turkey, and the continuing costs of maintaining the occupation Army of the 
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Rhine in Europe as evidence of a military stretched thin with too many demands on its 
resources with too few troops to carry them all out adequately. 
The Cairo Conference set itself two broad tasks. The first was to determine whom 
to support in the campaign for Iraq’s throne. This was eventually decided in Feisal’s 
favor, a former Hashemite king of Damascus who had been forced by the French to flee 
the city and seek exile in Europe. Some feared the French might object to Feisal’s 
candidacy, but this concern was set aside in the face of the argument that the French 
would more pleased in having Feisal securely on the Iraqi throne “stirring up trouble 
throughout Arabia.” A more critical concern was the Arab reaction to Feisal, and 
specifically, Ibn Saud’s reaction to Feisal’s kingship. It was thought that if Feisal was 
proclaimed King of Iraq, there was a “great possibility of a conflagration flaring up 
throughout the Arabian Peninsula.” In Feisal’s favor were his perceived hostility to 
Communism and his descent from the tribe of Quraish, the Prophet Muhammad’s tribe, 
which was thought would make him acceptable to Iraq’s Shiite majority, even though 
Feisal himself was a Sunni. Also consequential was the fact that Feisal’s brother was a 
good friend of Mustapha Kemal’s, the leader of Turkey, and was believed to be in 
constant contact with him. This familial connection between the leaders was thought by 
the conference to likely serve to dampen down Turkish intrigues, which were rife in Iraq, 
especially in the north.66  
The second task was determining future British military dispositions in Iraq. The 
Cairo Conference determined that the current garrison in Iraq would be reduced to some 
12 battalions by 1922, a reduction of almost one-half. Further reductions were 
anticipated, down to 8 battalions, or fewer. Of these, it was hoped that only two would be 
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British battalions, the balance composed of either Indian Army troops or native Iraqi 
levies. The War Office was opposed to this however, as it wanted, in Churchill’s words, 
to use Iraq as a permanent “testing grounds” for soldiers in desert warfare. Churchill 
considered this unacceptable, although he presented the Cabinet with the army’s position, 
along with his rejection of it, stating that “if no other way can be found of holding the 
country, we can better give up [Iraq] at once,” a bit of hyperbole Churchill, so committed 
to maintaining Britain’s presence in Iraq, doubtless did not mean, although it underscored 
his feelings on the subject of economizing at almost all costs. 
The Cairo Conference also considered Trenchard’s scheme of air policing, which 
Churchill, as Colonial and Air Secretary, backed to the hilt. Trenchard proposed a 
garrison of eight squadrons of the Royal Air Force, three armored-car companies, two 
armored trains, four gunboats, a pack battery from the Indian army, and four infantry 
battalions, of which two would be British. This force, backed by the Iraqi Army, which 
Britain would establish and advise, would be capable of maintaining internal security in 
Iraq. Trenchard stated during the conference that he felt “willing to assume 
responsibility” for Iraq with such a force at his disposal. Crucially, Churchill felt that 
“such a system could, I think, with careful pruning be maintained with the [financial] 
limits.” 
Also important for the success of the air policing scheme was the “greatly 
improved” state of Iraq. The “political arrangement which are to form the foundation of 
our future position in Mesopotamia are far advance and are progressing favourably,” 
Churchill thought. He also cabled to the Cabinet that he had from the “outset 
contemplated holding Mesopotamia not by sheer force, but by the acquiescence of the 
people of Mesopotamia as a whole in a Government and Rule whom they have freely 
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accepted, and who will be supported by the Air Force, and by British organised levies, 
and by 4 Imperial battalions.” Even it this was a bit of artful sophistry on Churchill’s part, 
which it likely was, it nevertheless gets at the heart of the reality of air policing, in that it 
did not rely on force alone, and was never conceived as such by its advocates. 
Furthermore, the government of Iraq would be “conducted by an Arab 
administration under King Feisal, who will act in general accordance with the advice 
tendered him by the High Commissioner.” The Conference was at pains to reassure 
critics that the air force garrisons in Iraq were thoroughly capable of defending 
themselves from a “rising or local disorder.” One critique of the air policing scheme was 
that with so few British ground troops in Iraq, air force bases would be vulnerable to 
ground attack. Churchill reassured the Cabinet this was not so, arguing that if another 
rising were to take place, an evacuation from Baghdad—the chief British air base in 
Iraq—could be swiftly evacuated down the Tigris towards the Persian Gulf in purpose-
built armed barges. If the “worst comes to the worst,” Churchill argued, Britain retained 
the capability in Iraq to evacuate its personnel without needing to send a rescue 
expedition. This would not only protect British servicemen, but would do so within the 
financial limits, which were “inviolate.”67 
Cairo was predicated with limited goals in mind, as Trenchard himself later 
acknowledged in a private letter of October 1, 1922 to Marshal Salmond, the air force 
commander in Iraq.68 Air policing could only succeed if there was no external threat to 
Iraq, and if Iraq was free of organized rebellion aside from “ordinary spasmodic 
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disturbances.”69 This marked a departure from the War Ministry’s argument that British 
forces needed to prepare for simultaneous Kurdish and Arab risings.70 The air force’s 
position was that the Kurds and the Arabs lacked the capacity and the desire to 
coordinate, but it is telling that the air force chose not to deny the essential validity of the 
War Department’s argument. Even air policing’s most passionate proponents recognized 
its inherent limitations. 
Trenchard further recognized in his correspondence that air power alone was not 
sufficient in suppressing rebellions in Iraq. He compared the situation in the north of Iraq 
with that of the Northwest Frontier in India. In India, air strikes were followed by 
punitive operations on the ground, the psychological impact of bombing being combined 
with the ability of an infantry column to root out resistance.71 Before air policing had even 
been accepted as official British policy in Iraq, Trenchard was, privately at least, 
acknowledging that air power could not operate effectively in isolation. Combined 
operations were necessary. The air policing scheme provided for “maximum work by the 
police, minimum casualties on both sides, and the attainment of the object in the shortest 
time.”72 As Salmond recognized in his command report to Trenchard, local levies and the 
Iraqi police had a “considerable part to play in the normal control of the country.”73 
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Internal air staff memorandums issued in 1920 further revealed a keen interest 
within the air force over the relevance of the Indian Northwest Frontier as a model for 
Iraq, especially in the Kurdish north. Along the Northwest Frontier, British forces 
contended with Afghan tribes engaged in low-level guerrilla warfare. Based out of border 
forts, British columns launched punitive missions against belligerent tribal leaders. The 
air force believed that in the future, aircraft could replace these columns, giving a much 
higher degree of mobility and flexibility to British military operations. Areas difficult to 
reach on the ground would be vulnerable to attack from the air. Aircraft could also bring 
power to bear much more swiftly than a ground-based column could.74 
The air force further recognized that the successful implementation of air policing 
in Iraq necessitated a gradual handover from the army to the Royal Air Force. Once the 
1920 uprising was suppressed, air force control was initially limited to the north of 
Baghdad, away from the restive heart of the rebellion.75 Once the situation on the ground 
had stabilized, the handover could proceed. The success of air policing was predicated on 
at least partial stability.76 Churchill himself acknowledged this in March 1920 by 
proposing a gradualist approach to governing Iraq: increasing local influence by 
establishing friendly relations with local tribal leaders, establishing local militias and 
raising local troops, and opening up previously closed areas for trade.77 There was no 
need to govern everything all at once, Churchill argued. Instead, he advocated a “block-
by-block” approach based upon the threat of aerial bombardment to keep the local tribal 
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leaders from rebelling. He conceived of the airplane as an omnipresent eye in the sky, 
monitoring movement on the ground, and uncovering and crushing unrest before it spread 
(beyond the point where air power alone would be insufficient to bring the situation back 
under control).78 
Despite these reassurances, many critics remained unconvinced. Churchill 
defended himself in parliament by stating, “I cannot give an absolute guarantee that any 
scheme we may pursue in Mesopotamia will infallibly succeed, or that troubles will not 
arise in this vexatious country. But there is no other way in which the promises made to 
Parliament for reduction in cost can be kept. Moreover, it would not be right to spend a 
larger sum upon retaining our position in Mesopotamia. Politically, I do not believe we 
could defend it, and from an Imperial point of view it would be a misapplication of 
limited and overstrained resources. I think it is the best we can do in all the 
circumstances.”79 
Churchill also defended the conclusions of the Cairo Conference in Cabinet by 
citing Iraqi public opinion.80 The state of Iraq, he reported in his summary of his position, 
was much improved since the 1920 rebellion. The tide had definitely turned against the 
insurgents, Churchill felt. Political arrangements for a final Iraqi disposition were well in 
hand. Feisal, about to be crowned king, was “generally acclaimed” by the Iraqi 
population. There were nagging problems with the state of the Iraq levies, intended to 
form the basis of an eventual independent Iraqi army, but this was felt to be easily 
remediable. Most important, the power of the air force was increasingly making itself 
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felt, and this was before the air control regime had been implemented in full. For his part, 
General Haldane, previously an inveterate opponent of air policing, now believed that if 
he had had sufficient aircraft in the fall of 1920 he could have forestalled the Iraqi 
uprising.81 Furthermore, Churchill professed that he had never intended on controlling 
Iraq by force alone; the acquiescence of Iraqis in maintaining British influence in Iraq 
was of key importance. Churchill foresaw an independent, sovereign Iraq friendly with 
Great Britain, at peace with its neighbors, open to British commerce, and making few 
demands on the Treasury. The only possible impediment to the realization of such a 
seductive vision was the weight of an unsustainable British garrison that would 
necessitate a precipitate British pull-out from Iraq before the post-uprising gains had been 
consolidated. The swift adoption of air policing would prevent this from happening. 
The General Staff sensed the tide of opinion was moving against its position, but 
refused to acknowledge its defeat, and weighed back in with yet another memorandum on 
“Policy and Finance in Mesopotamia,” which circulated on August 17, the day before the 
Cabinet was scheduled to meet and debate the Cairo Conference’s recommendations. 
While agreeing that financial economies were of the utmost importance, the 
memorandum disagreed about almost everything else. The army rejected Churchill’s 
argument that it was simply too expensive to maintain British soldiers in Iraq with the 
kind of establishment and supplies they were used to back in Britain. Given the 
Mesopotamia’s status as a “poor, starving, bankrupt,” country, the War Office wrote, it is 
necessary to maintain British troops in the “maximum of comfort possible under the 
conditions” if British troops were to be “maintained in a state of efficiency and high 
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morale.” If the costs were too high, the War Office argued, then it would be better to 
abandon Iraq altogether. 
As for the proposal of transfer of command in Iraq from the army to the air force 
in the name of cost-cutting, the army sharply noted under air policing, the air force would 
be raising units of gunboats, armored trains, supplies, signals, ordnance, medical, 
veterinary, and other similar services, all of which were ground forces functions, and all 
duties of which the army feared it would be forced to train the air force to how to carry 
out while having to bear the fiscal costs of doing so. The army deprecated the utility of 
native levies, and argued that only British soldiers could carry out the necessary ground 
tasks. 
Furthermore, the “only weapons which can be used by the air force are bombs and 
machine guns...Punitive measures may have to be taken against disturbers of the peace; 
the only means at the disposal of the Air Force, and the means now in fact used, are the 
bombing of the women and children in the villages. If the Arab population realize that the 
peaceful control of Mesopotamia ultimately depends on our intention of bombing women 
and children, I am very doubtful we shall gain that acquiescence of the fathers and 
husbands of Mesopotamia as a whole to which the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
[Churchill] looks forward. More probable is it that the new King, Feisal, will complain 
that he cannot expect loyal co-operation of the tribes so long as their women and children 
are done to death.”82 
The army also found fault with the plans for evacuation of the British garrison. 
Accepting for the sake of argument that the evacuation would work as Churchill and the 
air policing advocates argued, the army was “disturbed” at the implication that any 
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British evacuation would leave native levies “to their fate.” This not only seemed 
problematic in terms of loyalty—native levies would refuse to ally with British soldiers 
they knew were prepared to abandon them in the event of an uprising—but also because 
“leave our friends in the lurch has not hitherto been a policy of the British Government.” 
The army, the memorandum stated, continued to see no alternative to a large British 
reserve remaining in Iraq. The army concluded by stating that it was unwise and 
uneconomic to allow the air force to Iraq to “depart from its present functions of an 
ancillary force” and the command and control scheme for the air policing regime as had 
been proposed by the air force and confirmed by the Cabinet was “unconstitutional and 
would lead to hopeless confusion.” 
This last ditch effort by the General Staff failed to persuade the Cabinet, which 
met on August 18th as scheduled and formally adopted air policing as British strategy in 
Iraq. Defeated, the army remained unreconstructed, and chose a different tack in its 
attacks on the air force in the future by striking on the flank and attempting to “partition” 
the air force.83 In short, the War Office proposed that since many air force units in Iraq—
such as the armored car units, which were acknowledged by air force officers serving in 
Iraq to be an integral part of the air policing regime—essentially duplicated army 
functions, these air force units should be folded back within the structure of the army. 
“‘Millions’” of pounds would be saved. The Cabinet did not address the issue head on, 
instead deciding not to “reopen the question of an independent air force,” which was 
tantamount to declaring it would tolerate no more trouble-making from the army, 
although not in so many words. 
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This last represented the final salvos in the struggle between the War Office and 
the Air Ministry over who would control Iraq policy. It was a battle that had frustrated 
Trenchard greatly. A consummate bureaucratic infighter, Trenchard was a great asset for 
the newly independent institution at a time when its very existence was coming seriously 
into question. Wise to the machinations of civil servants and army generals alike, 
Trenchard retained a constant capacity to be seemingly surprised by the army’s continued 
opposition and last minute objections, which Trenchard felt were specious and self-
serving.84  
When Lloyd George’s coalition government fell in 1922, the Conservatives were 
returned to power and Sir Samuel Hoare was appointed the new Minister for Air. At 42, 
he was a young man in the cabinet, and possessed of a “good and quick brain,” Trenchard 
felt. The air marshal was also pleased to learn Hoare was “keen on maintaining the Air 
Service and its prestige.” Hoare took a long view of Iraqi prospects, as did Trenchard. 
Hoare wanted to reduce the British presence in Iraq, but not precipitately. The Iraqi 
regime needed at least three years before it could take administrative responsibility for 
itself, and even then there would continued to be a need for a British military garrison. 
Reductions in British army battalions posted in Iraq would continue, as the Cairo 
Conference had mandated, but only after the Iraqis had raised four battalions of their own 
and trained them to a “reasonable” level of effectiveness.85 
Trenchard considered the position of the new Conservative government towards 
the Iraqi royal regime to be that it had four years organize itself effectively, after which 
Britain was leaving, regardless of whether or not the regime was ready for the withdrawal 
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of British support.86 He considered this short-sighted, but felt confident that British 
officers would remain in advisory capacities beyond the four year limit. Additionally, air 
force squadrons would remain behind, under treaty arrangements yet to be negotiated.87 
Worries over the quality of the Iraqi levies continued to dog Trenchard.88 He knew 
local forces were critical to the success of air policing. In a typical operation, Iraqi forces 
would carry out the first operation.89 Even in the most sensitive missions, those dealing 
with individuals responsible for killing British air force pilots, local police were given the 
lead. In April 1924, three British pilots were shot down and killed by angry tribesmen. 
Iraqi police were dispatched to arrest those responsible, and the army occupied the village 
where the perpetrators lived. Air action was not taken, even though collective punishment 
was systematically practiced in Iraq.90 Similarly, in August 1924, when two more British 
pilots were shot down and killed, Iraqi policemen were again dispatched to arrest those 
responsible. Air action was not taken in this case either.91 
Air policing was designed to extend the power of the central government in the 
countryside. Iraq in the 1920’s was an overwhelmingly rural and tribal society. Outside 
of the cities, local tribal leaders were usually the most important figures in the political 
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power structure. Suspicious of government intrusion, tribal leaders usually resisted the 
presence of government agents, almost always policemen, on the local scene. When 
villages were bombed, the action almost always took place because police had been 
attacked, or refused access. Air force operations were designed to provide police with 
maximum flexibility in their movements around Iraq.92 
Throughout, Trenchard deftly navigated the twists and turns of Iraq policy to the 
great advantage of the air force. He remained deeply concerned with public opinion: at 
one point Trenchard mandated a title change from “Operations Report” to “Report of 
Work Done” in official air force reports sent to London from Baghdad on the grounds 
that the latter downplayed the significance of events in Iraq. In a similar vein, Trenchard 
prevented the publication of bomb tonnage expended in Iraq, arguing that the army 
forbore from releasing the number of shells of bullets army personnel fired. The tone of 
air force reports also came in for criticism, much of which he felt provided an inaccurate 
picture and contributed to a picture in the press of “constant restlessness” in Iraq’s 
villages. Iraq, he averred, was largely quiescent. 
Salmond was less sanguine. He noted in a private letter summarizing the situation 
in Iraq that pro-Turkish propaganda was significantly up from a year earlier. Turkish 
nationalists had swept to power in the 1919-1920 elections in Turkey, and Salmond 
feared, but could not prove, an orchestrated campaign on the part of the Turkish 
government to stir unrest in British-held Iraq. More disturbing from Salmond’s viewpoint 
was the revelation that the clergy of Karbala and Najaf had prepared orders for the Shia 
population not to resist if Turkey invaded. While these orders had not actually been 
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issued, it worried Salmond, especially when combined with the knowledge the Turks 
were inserting army units surreptitiously to northern Kurdish mountain valleys.93 
Revealingly, Salmond never once mentioned aircraft. His letter is full of details of 
troop movements, and how he was deploying soldiers in the north to counter the 
continuing infiltration of Turkish soldiers, but never how he was using aircraft in Iraq. 
Nor did Trenchard press him in his reply. Salmond might have assumed Trenchard was 
already familiar with air operations in Iraq. More likely, Salmond chose not to mention 
the role of aircraft because the most important work was being done on the ground by 
British army battalions, native levies, and Iraqi policemen. Salmond recognized the 
purpose of air policing to be supporting “the political authorities in their tasks of 
pacification and administration.”94 
The War Office also raised the vexatious issue of morality. Was it moral to bomb 
rural Iraqi villages? Doing so might effectively compel the rural leadership, but the 
ability of the villages to defend themselves from the air was almost non-existent. More 
problematic from Trenchard’s viewpoint were questions raised to Parliament over the 
issue.95 To pre-empt such questions, or to deflect them if raised, Trenchard wrote 
Salmond and directed him to write what in affect amounted to a Royal Air Force position 
paper that highlighted the difficulty of policing Iraq, the efficiency of air force 
operations, and an outline of how the air force “kept the country quiet.” Trenchard 
planned to use the letter as evidence to counter potential critics in parliament. He also 
chastised Salmond gently to gain control over junior officers “mixing themselves up in 
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policy.”96 Trenchard was increasingly aware that these questions were usually expressed 
along moral lines. 
Salmond’s reply was notable not only as a robust defense of air policing policy, 
but also revealing how Salmond viewed the air force’s role not centrally, but as part of an 
integrated whole that contained a range of options escalating from police patrols to air 
strikes.97 Salmond emphasized that his mission was one of internal security; defending 
Iraq externally was beyond his capabilities. Policymaking in Iraq was a constant 
negotiation between the British high commissioner and the Iraqi government. Air 
policing was not solely British, but a “combined policy” of the Iraqi and British 
governments. Aerial bombings were always used as a last resort, and only when a 
localized anti-government rising occurred. The vast majority of such cases were resolved 
by police action, without resort to the air force. 
 The battle over air policing was won unequivocally by the air force, which 
instituted an aerial regime of colonial control more thoroughly than anywhere else in the 
British Empire. The army resented the praise the air force received from all quarters in 
both cutting costs—British expenditures in Iraq fell from some £20 million in 1922 to 
under £3.5 million in 1925—while maintaining stability because it felt its own role in 
achieving that stability was almost always overlooked: it was the British army that had 
put down the 1920 rising, and when it handed responsibility for Iraq over to the air force 
in 1922, Iraq was largely quiescent and stable under the rule of its new king. The last 
British infantry battalion departed Iraq in 1929, while the air force retained responsibility 
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for Iraq’s internal security until October 1932, although the Royal Air Force remained 
through World War II, albeit without an active operational role. 
On one level, the air policing regime was a singular success. British financial 
expenditures were greatly reduced, and the size of the British garrison in Iraq was greatly 
shrunk from its late 1920 high. Ultimately backed by the power of the Royal Air Force’s 
bomber squadrons centrally based around Baghdad, the Iraqi royal regime headed by 
King Feisal was outwardly stable. The 1920 uprising was not repeated, and post-1920 
outbreaks of violence remained sporadic and localized.  
On another level, however, air policing must be judged a failure. Air policing was 
not adopted because it was the best possible scheme of colonial control; it was adopted 
because it was the least expensive in manpower and in pounds, and because Trenchard 
saw it as a proving ground for a newly independent air force. Air policing could not solve 
the lack of political stability at the very top of the Iraqi government. Between 1921, when 
Faisal was crowned king of Iraq, and 1958, when the Iraqi royal family was murdered 
during a military coup, Iraq saw no fewer than 58 separate changes of government. The 
problems plaguing the Iraq central government were fundamentally political, not military. 
Air policing could offer only a temporary solution at best. The political dimension of air 
policing is virtually absent in the literature. When political issues are introduced, they are 
usually discussed in the context of British domestic politics. These are undoubtedly 
crucial; one of the chief arguments for air policing was that the British public would no 
stomach any greater overseas commitment in the immediate aftermath of World War I. 
The ramifications and implications of air policing for Iraqi politics is much less 
discussed, even in the literature by historians focused on specifically Iraqi national 
history, where the British occupation is glossed over either as an interlude or a brief 
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phase of national history with few lasting impacts overall. This treatment is surprising 
given the fundamental weaknesses in the Iraqi national government that air policing 
revealed (but did not create). Every year the Royal Air Force was responsible for internal 
security in Iraq, from 1922 through 1936, saw Iraqi villages struck from the air, 
underscoring the extraordinary degree to which central government control in the villages 
was lacking. Without the Royal Air Force, it is at least probable that rural villages – and 
perhaps entire provinces – would have slipped from the control of the Iraqi government. 
Thus air policing underscored the great gulf between Iraq’s rulers and Iraq’s ruled, and 
the, in generous terms, inchoate sense of national identity among Iraqis as a whole. Iraqis 
remained split along sectarian, ethnic, and religious lines, without agreement on who was, 
and who was not, Iraqi.  
Also striking in the literature is the absence of a sustained discussion over how air 
policing came to be adopted as policy. For some, it is simply assumed, and the focus is on 
how the air policing regime was implemented operationally. Other works focus only on 
the broad-brush strokes of the debate, and gloss over the details. Also, while there has 
been some limited focus on the policy debate behind air policing, no work up to this time 
has highlighted the deep split between the army and the air force over Iraq policy. This is 
an important aspect of the history of the air policing regime, and one that deserves more 
focus than it has hitherto received. The army ultimately lost the debate, but the army-air 
force divide remains strangely forgotten in the air policing historiography. 
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